Godin on Gladwell on Anderson on Free

A quick note on Seth Godin’s response to Malcolm Gladwell’s review of Chris Anderson’s book, Free: The Future of a Radical Price:

Godin predicts that The New Yorker will go out of business a few dozen words before noting:

People will pay for content if it is so unique they can’t get it anywhere else, so fast they benefit from getting it before anyone else, or so related to their tribe that paying for it brings them closer to other people. […] People will not pay for by-the-book rewrites of news that belongs to all of us. People will not pay for yesterday’s news, driven to our house, delivered a day late, static, without connection or comments or relevance.

Everything he notes about what content people will pay for applies to The New Yorker, perhaps more than to any other magazine appealing to the same audience. Likewise, the magazine goes far beyond each of the kinds of things Godin says people won’t pay for. Above all, New Yorker content is unique, “tribal,” and always provided with connection, comment, and relevance.

The contradiction may stem from an equivocation between high-profile magazines like The New Yorker and Condé Nast (on which Godin is also bearish) and much-beleaguered formats like the newspaper—which, as we all seem to know by now, can’t do classifieds as well as Craigslist, can’t sell advertising as well as magazines, can’t be as timely as online news outlets, can’t be as relevant or unique as high-dollar outfits (either online or offline) with national offices and best-of-the-best staffs.


Update

Just this morning, The Lone Gunman posted a thoughtful piece on these issues, wondering, “[C]ould the success of The Economist be attributed to [its] evolution from newspaper counterprogramming to counterprogramming for the ‘undigested, undigestible information online’?”

Profiles, Pages, and Facebook Spam

Earlier today, I received a Facebook friend request from a user account named for a web-based software product. Before dismissing the request, I sent a message to the account that read:

A business or product having a regular FB account instead of a Page is tantamount to spam.

I received a response from the Community Manager associated with this product, asking for clarification. Since I’ve seen this problem before, I’ve decided to post my explanation here, instead of replying privately. So here it is:

First, I expect to receive friend requests only from people. More generally, I don’t want unsolicited communication on Facebook from organizations. When your organization sends me a friend request, you are sending me spam, just as if you had sent me an unsolicited email.

Unsurprisingly, Facebook’s Rules corroborate my position:

  • “Profiles can only be used to represent an individual, and must be held under an individual name.”
  • “All personal site features, such as friending and messaging, are also for personal use only and may not be used for professional promotion.”
  • “Using personal site features for professional promotion, or creating unauthorized Pages, may result in your account being warned or disabled.”

In short, using a regular Facebook account (which is for people) instead of a Page (which is for organizations) gives you access to personal accounts that organizations should not have. (That “should” represents both a philosophical and a systemic imperative, in my mind.) When you take advantage of that access—by sending friend requests, for example—you are spamming.


Update

The organization’s community manager has responded; with his permission, I post his comments here:

hmm…I get your point, but I’d appreciate more flexibility on the whole “spam” concept. We are not trying to scam you, not even sell you anything. On the contrary, we are inviting you to be a part of an idea that we consider to be helpful to every user in the web and we are giving you the option to reject this invitation.

As we see it, Popego is a person made of software and silicon chips, so it is only natural that it has Twitter and Facebook accounts. We do not spam our followers in Facebook or Twitter and we get 10 new ‘friend requests’ every day so I don’t believe that too many people share your vision of spam.

I should first repeat my private commendation of the community manager for his ceaseless courtesy, which I hope I’ve returned.

Beyond that, of course, he and I don’t find accord on much. To his first point—the implication that it only counts as spam if the goal is to “scam” or to “sell”—I disagree. Any unsolicited mass communication in violation of reasonable expectations is spam. This case amounts to such a violation because Facebook explicitly limits the role of organizations within the service. This creates a reasonable expectation that users will not receive mass communications from organizations they haven’t invited to communicate with them (e.g., by becoming Fans of those organizations).

Neither do I find it relevant that the account in question receives friend requests (the community manager’s final point). For one thing, the account receiving friend requests doesn’t violate the norms of Facebook in the same way as the account sending them. More to the point, just because some users don’t share my expectation, that doesn’t mean it’s not a reasonable expectation to have. Again, I take it to be reasonable, at a minimum, because of Facebook’s own stance on the matter.

Finally, a pair of the rhetorical gestures in the response warrant examination. The argument that because a web service somehow having personality (and a smiley-face as part of the logo) makes it “a person” is specious with or without Facebook’s definition of personhood to turn to. Likewise, using flowery optimism (“an idea that we consider to be helpful to every user in the web”) as a defense against charges of spamming seems like an abuse of the good cheer underlying much of the last few years of innovation on the web.

Puzzles or Placation?: How We (Can) Watch Movies

In a recent post on his excellent blog, The Frontal Cortex, Jonah Lehrer responds to David Denby’s review of State of Play. In accord with Denby, Lehrer remarks:

Ever since Pulp Fiction, and certainly since The Usual Suspects, there’s been a segment of filmmakers that sees the movie as akin to a puzzle, an artistic form which should only make sense in the moments before the final credits start to roll.

He then remarks that “the essential state of movie-watching”—which he also calls “the fundamental experience of watching a movie” and refers to as the reason “people go to the movie theater”—is a state of “total immersion.” The “puzzle film,” as we might call it, defies these practices.

In this post, I want to complicate the privileging of this one way of watching movies, which Lehrer also describes as “dissolv[ing] into the spectacle on the screen.” Are there other possibilities? What kinds of value do they have?

First, some of us will enjoy films like State and Play more than others. As an afterthought, Lehrer mentions the postmodern novel as in the family of the puzzle film; it’s worth noting that few critics question the “art” of the postmodern novel—they just reduce the problem to one of personal taste.

Not so with film, which has since its earliest days been kept to the wrong side of a false dichotomy involved “art” and “entertainment.” At a minimum, people ought to treat puzzle films at least like Seinfeld and Costanza treated homosexuality, with a committed not-that-there’s-anything-wrong-with-that attitude.

Second, and more pertinent from a cognitive-science perspective though, even the most conventional narrative films necessarily engage us in puzzle-solving activity. Even setting aside the detective film, understanding any story requires a mix of attention, memory, and other forms of cognition to make sense at all.

Most narrative films make these tasks easier for us by adhering to a well-developed system of conventions, or by carefully taking into account our attentive or perceptual capabilities and limitations. But if they do so, it’s to satisfy an expectation, and to make money—not because there’s something more fundamental within the art itself of film about this approach.

To see how all this works, try this exercise (which my Intro to Film Studies class will also undertake in their first session on Monday): Choose a Hollywood film you haven’t seen, but that you can easily watch. Write down everything you know or expect about the film before you begin watching. What do your experiences of the genre, stars, country of origin, marketing, and other factors prepare you for? Next, watch the opening of that film and take careful note of everything you learn—from the music, the dialogue, the cinematography, the editing, and so on. It’s truly an overwhelming amount of information to list out, and you have to understand most of it to follow even the most basic of films.1

Finally, it’s worth noting that varied models of spectatorship go back a long way in film. Alain Resnais’s Last Year at Marienbad (1961) not only forces the puzzle mode of spectatorial engagement, it avoids providing any solution—and even takes steps to ensure no cohesive solution can be found. The film, in other words, presents a kind of internal narrative contradiction not as complete as in surrealist films like Dali & Buñuel’s Un Chien Andalou (1929), but at any rate well beyond Tarantino.

The kind of thinking has led to new theories of artistic practice outside the cinema, too. As the first commenter on Lehrer’s post notes, Bertolt Brecht (among other interwar German thinkings, including Siegfried Kracauer and Walter Benjamin) had the idea that to lose oneself in a dramatic work would interfere with one’s full understanding of the human situation in the work and in the world surrounding it. Empathy, in other words, breeds sheep. Need that be our only choice at the movies?


1Many books and journal articles have been dedicated to spelling out these complex interactions of world, film, and mind. These include David Bordwell’s Narration in the Fiction Film (1985), Murray Smith’s Engaging Characters: Fiction, Emotion, and the Cinema, and Edward Branigan’s Narrative Comprehension in Film (1992), and Carl Plantinga’s and Greg Smith’s anthology Passionate Views: Film Cognition and Emotion (1999).

Narrator/Narration

In written fiction, if a story, novel, etc., is narrated in the third person, then the story has no narrator—only a narration, composed by an author and read by a reader.

More precisely, unless a character in the diegesis narrates, there is no narrator—only narration.

This also alleviates a trouble of those who try to analogize fictional and cinematic narrators. It turns out that, in the latter, as the former, there is no narrator—only narration—unless a character in the diegesis narrates.

And then, in film, there must still be a narration, since the character’s narrating represents only a part of the storytelling; there remain editing, performance, music, composition of the shot, and all the other extra-linguistic devices.